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CASE NOTES
Federal Estate Taxation—Cross Estate—Inclusion of Trust Assets
Where Settlor Retains Control of the Corporation Whose Stock is
Transferred to the Trust—Section 2036( a) (2 )—United States v.
Byrum.1—In 1958 Byrum created an irrevocable inter vivos trust
benefiting his children or, in the event of their death before termina-
tion of the trust, their surviving children. Under the terms of the
trust, a bank was appointed sole trustee. The trustee was authorized
to exercise its discretion to accumulate the trust's income or to dis-
tribute it to the beneficiaries.' The corpus of the trust consisted al-
most entirely of stock in three closely held corporations.' Prior to the
creation of the trust Byrum had owned the majority of the outstanding
shares of all three corporations. Upon creation of the trust, Byrum
and the trust each owned approximately the same number of shares
in two of the corporations, while Byrum retained a greater percentage
of ownership in the third. 4
 In contrast to the trustee's extensive
authority over distribution of trust income, the trustee's authority to
distribute and invest the principal was severely limited. By express
language in the trust agreement Byrum retained for himself (1) the
right to vote the shares of stock held in trust, (2) the right to dis-
approve the sale or transfer of the trust assets by the trustee, (3) the
right of approval over trust investment and (4) the right to remove
the trustee and designate a corporate successor.° Thus the trustee could
not distribute the transferred stock or attempt to deal with the stock
in any way without the approval of Byrum, the settlor. Byrum did not
retain, however, the right to direct payment or accumulation of the
trust income or the right to change the beneficiaries of the trust.
In 1964 Byrum died and subsequently the Commissioner of In-
1 408 U.S. 125, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
2 The trustee's authority to distribute income was delineated by broad guidelines:
Article VI. Distribution Prior To Age 21.
Until my youngest living child reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years,
the Trustee shall exercise absolute and sole discretion in paying or applying the
income and/or principal of the trust to or for the benefit of Grantor's child
or children and their issue, with due regard to their individual needs for educa-
tion, care, maintenance and support and not necessarily in equal shares, per
stirpes. The decision of the Trustee in the dispensing of Trust funds for such
purposes shall be final and binding on all interested persons.
408 U.S. at 129.
Id. at 157 n.1 (dissenting opinion). The dissent noted that other than the corporate
stock, the only other assets of the trust were three Series E United States Savings Bonds
worth $300 total at maturity. Id.
4
 Id. at 130 n.2. After the creation of the trust the ownership of the stock was
distributed as follows:
Percentage of Total Stock Ownership
Trust & Decedent
Decedent
	 Trust
	 Combined
Byrum Lithographing Co., Inc. 59 12 71
Graphic Realty Inc. 35 48 83
Bychrome Co. 42 46 88
5 Id. at 127 n.1.
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ternal Revenue determined that the trust was includable in Byrum's
gross estate under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 2036, 8
which specifically requires:
(a) The value of gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer . . . under which
he had retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death . .. (1) the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property,
or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the property or the income therefrom.T
More specifically, the Government argued first that Byrum's re-
tention of the powers enumerated in the trust agreement—particularly
the power to vote the transferred stock—constituted enjoyment of the
transferred stock under section 2036(a) (1).8 Secondly, the Govern-
ment argued that Byrum's control over corporate dividend policy
involved an apparent ability to regulate the flow of income to the
trust, and that by allowing Byrum to shift the beneficial enjoyment
of trust income between the present beneficiaries and the remainder-
men, this ability was tantamount to the retention of the power to
designate income beneficiaries and therefore warranted inclusion of
the trust in Byrum's gross estate under section 2036(a) (2). 8 The
Government contended that this ability was derived from Byrum's
retained voting control over all three corporations, which enabled him
to regulate the flow of dividends into the trust."
The executrix of the estate, after paying the additional tax,
brought a refund action in federal district court. The district court
granted the executrix' motion for summary judgment," and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 12 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
HELD: (1) that Byrum did not have an unconstrained de facto
power to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust, much less the
right to designate who was to enjoy the income from the trust," and
6 Although some of the cases discussed in this article were decided under the
predecessors of § 2036(a), the present statute for all practical purposes is identical to
its predecessors. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c)(I)(B); H.R.J. Res. 529, 71st Cong.,
3d Sess., 74 Cong. Rec. 7198, 46 Stat. 1516 (1931), amending Int. Rev. Code of 1926,
§ 302(c). For simplicity's sake, references in this article will be to § 2036(a) even where
the decisions discussed applied predecessors of the present statute.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2036.
8 408 U.S. at 131.
9 Id. at 131-32.
10 Id. at 132. This power to regulate the flow of dividends accrued from Byrum's
ability (1) to elect the corporate directors, and (2) theoretically, to dictate the dividend
policy of the corporations.
11 Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
12 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
la 408 U.S. at 143.
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therefore the trust was not includable in Byrum's gross estate under
section 2036(a) (2); and (2) that Byrum's retention of voting con-
trol over the transferred stock did not constitute enjoyment of that
stock within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1). 14
The Supreme Court's decision is significant in that it limits the
applicability of section 2036(a) (2). The Court, in defining the limits
of section 2036(a) (2), compared the retention of control over manage-
ment of the closely held corporation with the retention of broad
management or administrative powers over a trust by a settlor. It
relied upon a line of lower court decisions, handed down after passage
of section 2036(a) (2), which held that retention of the latter powers
does not necessarily require imposition of the estate tax on the trust.'
The Byrum majority apparently determined that the two types of
management powers—management of close corporations and manage-
ment of trusts—although factually distinguishable, should be treated
identically for purposes of section 2036(a) (2). 10 That is, just as a
settlor can exercise administrative control over the trust through reten-
tion of the decision-making function of the trust's investment policy
without subjecting the trust assets to the federal estate tax,' so, in
the case of a trust whose corpus is composed of stock in a closely
held corporation," a settlor can retain control of management of the
14 Id. at 150. This note will discuss only the first holding, since the significance of
the Byrum decision centers on the majority's interpretation of § 2036(a) (2). The
parameters of § 2036(a) (1) are clearly-defined, both by the specific statutory language
and by subsequent judicial history, to pertain to the retention by a settlor of' s. life
estate or life income in the transferred property or to the use of the trust income to
discharge an obligation of the settlor. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1960).
Since Byrum clearly did not retain either of these rights either directly or indirectly,
the majority correctly refused to apply § 2036(a)(1) to the Byrum trust.
15 408 U.S. at 133 & n.6. The Court went on to discuss Estate of Willard V. King,
37 T.C. 973 (1962), a leading decision in this line of cases. Id. at 134. The majority
also cited Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929), for the proposition that
"a settlor's retention of broad powers of management does not necessarily subject an
inter vivos trust to the federal estate tax." Id. at 133. The Northern Trust decision
preceded the passage of what is now § 2036(a), but the Byrum court stated that the
proposition articulated in Northern Trust is still valid and applies equally when the
management powers retained are powers of management over the corporations whose
stock comprises the trust assets. Id. at 134. The Court's actual language was: "Essentially
the power retained by Byrum is the same managerial power retained by the settlors in
Northern and in King. Although neither case controls this one ... the existence of such
precedents carries weight." Id.
18 Id.
17 These types of administrative controls have been defined as "what are considered
to be the normal powers granted to a trustee to permit him more effectively to
administer a trust." Gray & Covey, State Street—A Case Study of Sections 2036(a) (2)
and 2038, 15 Tax L. Rev. 75 n.2 (1959).
18 The control of investment policy is one of three types of retained management
powers important to § 2036(a) considerations. The other important management powers,
for § 2036(a) purposes, are: (1) retention of a right to allocate trust income, and (2)
retention of a right to exchange of trust assets. Id. In Byrum, the trustee alone had the
right to allocate income; the trustee's right to exchange trust assets or to invest them
was subject to Byrum's approval. Thus Byrum could not legally direct the trustee to
make investments or exchange assets; rather Byrum was limited to approving or vetoing
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corporation" without necessarily incurring the adverse estate tax
consequences of section 2036(a) (2). After Byrum there may still be
justification for applying section 2036(a) (2) to a trust in which a
settlor's retained powers of management provide indirect but sub-
stantial and unlimited control over income designation," but his re-
tention of power to affect indirectly the amount of income which a
particular beneficiary will receive, will not per se be sufficient
to warrant the imposition of federal estate tax under section
2036(a)(2).21
This note will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Byrum,
focusing on its interpretation of section 2036(a) (2). The decision
will be analyzed in light of that section's legislative and judicial his-
tory. In addition, an attempt will be made to estimate the future
ramifications of the decision in the area of trust formation. Finally,
it will be submitted that in Byrum the majority reached a correct
result under section 2036(a) (2); nevertheless, criticism will be offered
concerning some of. the reasoning which the majority employed to
reach that result.
Section 2036(a) (2) requires inclusion of a trust in the gross
estate of the decedent when the decedent has retained "the right
. . . to designate the person who shall possess or enjoy the property
or income therefrom."22 The Government sought to expand the
parameters of the statute to reach situations in which a settlor retains
voting control over a corporation and the stock of that corporation
comprises the trust assets.° In such situations, the trust is dependent
recommendations of the trustee. The trustee, in turn, was limited in his recommendations
by the fiduciary duty imposed generally on trustees.
ID Control over the investment policy of a trust which holds stock in a closely held
corporation is less valuable than that over one which holds stock in a public corporation.
Typically, the stock of a closely held corporation has little or no market value. See
discussion in Galler v. Galler, 321 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1964). The
ability to shift investments is more important where trust assets are highly liquid, e.g.,
marketable securities.
20 See text as notes 61-63 infra.
21 This conclusion follows from the express language of the Byrum court in rejecting
control as per se grounds for imposing tax liability under § 2036(a). 408 U.S. at 138
n.13.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2036(a)(2). Section 2036(a) is quoted more completely
in the text at note 7 supra.
28 This policy was expressly articulated in Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 Cum. Bull. 269,
which states:
The value of nonvoting corporate common stock transferred in trust is includable
in the grantor's gross estate . . . where the grantor retained . , a controlling
interest in the corporate voting stock . . and where . . . the trustee was
restricted in any way in his power to dispose of the nonvoting stock . .. .
Since the grantor retained the power to regulate the income from the trans-
ferred property, he retained . . . the right to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
The Ruling further concludes that if
he also retains control over the disposition of the nonvoting stock • . . be has in
fact made a transfer whereby he has retained for his life the right to designate
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for income upon the dividends of the controlled corporation. Thus the
settlor in his role of controlling shareholder may exercise considerable
influence over the directors in formulating dividend policy and could
affect indirectly the amount of income which would flow to the trust.
The Government maintained that retention of corporate control was
tantamount to retention of the legal right to designate income bene-
ficiaries within the meaning of 2036(a) (2)." This note will submit
that the majority was correct in declining to expand the scope of
section 2036(a) (2), simply on the ground of Byrum's ability to affect
indirectly the amount of income distributed to the beneficiaries at a
particular time.
The legislative and judicial history of section 2036 provides some
insight regarding the intended scope of subsection (a) (2). , Section
2036 was enacted in 1931' in direct response to a number of Supreme
Court decisions' that allowed settlors to create inter vivos trusts and
retain for themselves life estates or a right to income without sub-
jecting the trusts to subsequent imposition of an estate tax on the
transferred property.' That the congressional intent underlying sec-
tion 2036 was to override the effect of these decisions" is apparent
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the transferred property or the income
therefrom.
Id. at 270.
24 408 U.S. at 132.
25 Act of Mar. 3, 1931, ch. 454, 46 Stat. 1516. The language of the present § 2036
is almost identical to that of the 1931 Act.
26 The first of these decisions was May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), which was
subsequently reaffirmed by three contemporaneous decisions: Burnet v. Northern Trust
Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931) ; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); McCormick v.
Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931). Congress reacted quickly: a Joint Resolution, which contains
substantially the same language as § 2036, was passed the day after the latter three
cases were decided. H.R.J. Res. 529, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 74 Cong. Rec. 7198, 46 Stat.
1516 (1931). The provisions of the Resolution were later incorporated in 2036. See
note 28 infra.
27 C. Lowndes & R. Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 136 (2d ed. 1962):
"[Title obvious purpose of these sections [2036 and 20381 is to tax transfers where the
transferor has not parted completely with the transferred property until his death."
Thus, § 2036 taxes not the designation of beneficiaries but the retention of a right to
designate beneficiaries.
28 Although the Joint Resolution that enacted the provisions later incorporated in
§ 2036 was passed one day after three of these decisions, see note 26 supra, apparently
the Treasury had earlier anticipated an unfavorable ruling in the three on the basis of
May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930). The Joint Resolution introduced by Rep. Hawley
was accompanied by a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Ogden
Mills, in which he estimated that without corrective legislative action, the Supreme
Court decisions of the previous day would "cause a loss in excess of one-third of the
revenue derived from the Federal estate tax, with anticipated refunds of in excess of
$25,000,000." 74 Cong. Rec. 7198 (1931). The actual legislation was initially drafted by
the Treasury, reported on favorably by the House Committee on Ways and Means, and
quickly ratified by the Congress. Id. at 7198-99. Congress in enacting the Resolution
accepted the Treasury's view that the Supreme Court decisions of the previous day
produced an undesirable result in the federal estate tax system. Thus, the Resolution—
and hence § 2036—can best be viewed as a measure designed to counteract that unfavor-
able result.
1095
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
from the words of one legislator explaining why the legislation had
been introduced: "If a person . . . creates a trust of his property and
provides that during his lifetime, he shall enjoy the benefits of it, .. .
the Supreme Court held that it goes to his heir free of any estate
tax . . . 2'29
 It is readily apparent that subsection (a) (1) of section
2036 was designed to preclude a settlor from retaining a legal right
to income from transferred property without incurring adverse estate
tax consequences; and the courts have consistently given effect to that
legislative design." On the other hand, subsection (a) (2) of section
2036 was never specifically discussed in any of the relevant con-
gressional reports, and its purpose is less evident. However, it has
been surmisedn that subsection (a) (2) was enacted in response to
a particular type of trust arrangement which the Supreme Court had
held not subject to estate tax in McCormick v. Burnet," one of the
decisions that, as noted above, prompted passage of section 2036. The
terms of the trust in that case required the trustee to distribute income
to such charities as the settlor would subsequently designate. Congress
apparently determined that the settlor's retention of a right to designate
without adverse tax consequences was as objectionable as retention
of a right to income." Also, Congress may have been fearful that
failure specifically to tax retention of designation rights would result
in the use of the "right to designate" to circumvent the estate taxation
of retention of the right to income. What is clear, however, is that
Congress was concerned only with the retention of a legal right to
designate income and never considered the possibility of applying
section 2036 (a) (2) to retention of other rights and powers which
only indirectly affect the amount of income a particular beneficiary
would receive. It is submitted that the Government's attempt to ex-
pand the scope of section 2036(a) (2) in Byrum is contrary to this
legislative intent. Viewed in its proper legislative context, section
2036(a)(2)
was concerned only with taxing trusts over which a decedent
retained a specific and direct right to designate who shall
29 74 Cong. Rec. 7198 (1931) (remarks of Rep. Hawley).
38 See generally Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949); Com-
missioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106
(1940). The provisions of § 2036(a)(1) are summarized in note 14 supra,
91 See, e.g., Gray & Covey, supra note 17, at 78-79.
82 283 U.S. 784 (1931). The factual description of the trust in McCormick is con-
tained in the lower court opinion, Commissioner v. McCormick, 43 F.2d 277, 278 (7th
Cir. 1930).
88 See text at note 34 infra. This interpretation of the intent behind § 2036(a)(2)
is supported by C. Lowndes & R. Kramer, supra note 27, at 152-53:
The obvious purpose of Section 2036(a)(2) is to equate the power to designate
income or possession with the direct retention of income under Section 2036
(a)(1). Presumably, therefore, in order to incur a tax under Section 2036(a)(2),
the decedent must have retained power to designate income or possession
whose direct retention would have incurred the tax under Section 2036(a)(1).
[Emphasis added.]
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receive the "income," and no thought was given to the tax-
ability of management powers which at best can only affect
the "income" indirectly?'
Despite this limited purpose on the part of Congress, the major
source of litigation concerning section 2036(a) (2) has been the ques-
tion of the extent to which 2036(a) (2) circumscribes the retention of
management powers over trusts, particularly the retention by the
settlor of the discretionary right to determine whether to accumulate
income or distribute it to the beneficiary?' Although it has been argued
that section 2036(a) (2) was never meant to apply to the retention
by a settlor of those management powers over a trust which are
normally granted to a trustee,' the courts, nevertheless, have seen fit
to require that whenever a settlor retains the legal right to determine
whether to accumulate or distribute income, that right must be limited
by ascertainable standards for distribution expressed in the trust
agreement:8T With one exception,88 the courts have allowed settlors
wide managerial discretion to determine investment policy and dis-
tribute income as long as the limiting standard imposed on their
management powers is one which a court of equity could apply to
insure that these powers were not used to shift income beneficiaries8°
In Byrum, of course, the Court was faced with a different type of
management power, the settlor's retention of managerial control of
the corporation which in turn enabled him to exercise his business
expertise to protect the value of his own holdings in the corporation
and also the value of the trust's holdings in the corporation.
In Byrum, the Government based its argument, in part, on the
1966 Supreme Court decision, United States v. O'Malley," in which
the extent of permissible control over trust income was discussed. In
O'Malley the settlor designated himself co-trustee and retained the
legal right to determine, with the other trustees, whether to accumulate
or distribute trust income. The issue in O'Malley was the taxability
under section 2036(a) (2) of the income which the settlor, as co-
trustee, in his discretion decided to accumulate in the trust," rather
84 Gray & Covey, supra note 17, at 79. See also note 33 supra.
85 See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970);
Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973
(1962); Estate of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
88 Gray & Covey, supra note 17, at 79.
87 See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970) ;
United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
88 State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). State Street
was severely questioned if not expressly overruled in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United
States, 423 F.2d 601, 603 (1st Cir. 1970).
80 The Byrum court expressly approved the reasoning of Estate of Willard V. King,
37 T.C. 973 (1962), which is representative of this line of decisions. 408 U.S. at 134. See
also note 15 supra.
40 383 U.S. 627 (1966). This was the last case prior to Byrum which interpreted
2036(a) (2).
41 Id. at 630.
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than distribute. The O'Malley Court held that when trust income is
added to principal it becomes includable in the settlor's gross estate;
this followed because the income, when added to principal, be-
came subject to the legal right reserved by the settlor in the trust
agreement to determine whether to accumulate or distribute further
income." This right was held to be equivalent to the right to designate
beneficiaries of the trust in the sense that the settlor, by distributing
the trust income or accumulating it in the trust, could confer the
trust income on the present beneficiaries or alternatively defer it to
the remaindermen. Since the settlor in O'Malley had in this manner
reserved the right to designate beneficiaries, the trust was held to be
includable in his gross estate under section 2036(a) (2). In Byrum,
the Government argued that Byrum's ability to regulate the flow of
income to the trust through his control of corporate dividend policy
was tantamount to the settlor's right in O'Malley to designate income
beneficiaries by virtue of his reserved right to distribute or accumulate
trust income.
It is essential to distinguish between the varying uses of the terms
"power" and "right" in O'Malley and Byrum because the distinction
between the two terms is extremely important to the decision in
Byrum. Section 2036(a) (2) expressly imposes estate taxation on the
transferred property when the grantor retains a "right ... to designate."
In O'Malley, the settlor, who was also a trustee, retained a legally
enforceable right to accumulate or distribute income without any
limiting standard. The O'Malley Court determined that the retention
of such a right fell within the scope of 2036(a) (2). However, the
O'Malley Court used the terms "right" and "power" interchangeably
to describe the nature of the ability of the settlor to designate income."
The Government in Byrum argued first that the O'Malley Court's
use of the term "power" interchangeably with the term "right"
warranted the application of section 2036(a) (2) whenever a settlor
retains either the right or a power to designate income beneficiaries.
Secondly, the Government asserted that Byrum, although not a trustee,
retained a power to designate income beneficiaries because he could
indirectly stop the flow of dividends to the trust by exercising his
42
 Id. at 633.
'IR Id. at 631-32. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2038, provides that:
(a) The value of gross estate shall include the value of all property—(1) • „
[t]o the extent of any interest herein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer ... subject ... to any change through the exercise of a power
(in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent . . . to alter, amend, revoke
Or terminate. [Emphasis added.]
Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in O'Malley and the dissenting opinion
in Byrum, utilized cases decided under § 2038 to support the Government's assertion that
§ 2036(a) (2) applies to the Byrum trust. Note, however, that the language of the two
sections differs: § 2036(a) (2) talks in terms of "retention of a right," while § 2038 is con-
cerned with "exercise of power." It would appear that the different statutory language
suggests that judicial interpretation of the term "power" in a § 2038 case is not deter-
minative of the meaning of the term "right" under § 2036(a) (2).
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majority control over the corporation. Thus the trust would have little
or no income if such were Byrum's wish. In each year that dividends
were withheld, the present beneficiary would be deprived of any op-
portunity to receive income. Earnings would be retained in the cor-
poration rather than distributed as dividends, and the corporate stock
would appreciate in value, providing a substantial benefit to the
ultimate beneficiary of the trust. This, the Government argued,
amounted to retention of the power to designate indirectly."
The majority in Byrum rejected. the Government's interpretation
of section 2036(a) (2) by distinguishing between the terms "right" and
"power," stating:
It must be conceded that Byrum reserved no such "right"
in the trust instrument or otherwise. The term "right," cer-
tainly when used in a tax statute, must be given its normal
and customary meaning. It connotes an ascertainable and
legally enforceable power, such as that involved in O'Malley.
Here, the right ascribed to Byrum was the power to use his
majority position and influence over the corporate directors
to "regulate the flow of dividends" to the trust. That "right"
was neither ascertainable nor legally enforceable and hence
was not a right in any normal sense of that term."
The majority's distinction in Byrum effectively points up the
qualitative difference between the retention of a legally enforceable
right and retention of a ,legally unenforceable power. For instance,
in O'Malley the settlor, as trustee, had the absolute legal right to deal
with any trust income exactly as he wished. He had the right to deter-
mine during his lifetime who, as between the present beneficiary and
remainderman, should receive trust „income. In Byrum the settlor
had no such legal right, since once income was paid to the trust, he
had no legal control over the trustee's decision to accumulate or
distribute that income." All the settlor retained was the power to
regulate the flow of diVidends to the trust.
It is submitted that the "right -power" distinction is consistent
with the limited role Congress initially intended for section
2036 (a) (2).4T The Government's position, which is essentially the
same position taken by the Byrum dissent, would improperly expand
the limited scope of section 2036 (a) (2) to include all corporate control
situations and could be used as a basis for future arguments that
section 2036(a) (2) applies whenever a settlor retains any power
indirectly to affect the flow of income which a particular beneficiary
might receive."
44 408 U.S. at 132.
45 id. at 136-37 (footnotes omitted).
46
 See trust agreement, 408 U.S. at 127 n.l..
47 See text at notes 30-34 supra.
48 The Government unsuccessfully attempted this exact approach in Estate of Arthur
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It should be emphasized, however, that the majority's "right-
power" distinction is not wholly determinative of the estate taxation
issue in Byrum. According to the majority, the retention of an un-
limited legal right, as in O'Malley, requires the application of section
2036(a) (2); retention of an alleged power to designate, as in Byrum,
requires further inquiry into the exact nature and scope of the
power." Accordingly, the majority next addressed itself to determining
whether, despite its right-power distinction, the trust in Byrum was
still includable in the settlor's gross estate. It appears from the Court's
rationale that it adopted the premise that a decision to apply section
2036 (a) (2) to the trust would have required an affirmative answer
to two distinct questions. First, does a controlling shareholder actually
have the power to dictate, what the corporation's dividend will be?
Secondly, assuming the controlling shareholder has that power, is
such power equivalent to the right to designate income beneficiaries
within the meaning of section 2036(a) (2)? The Court never reached
this second question since it answered the first question negatively"
and decided the case on the ground that the settlor in Byrum did not
have the unrestrained power to determine dividends, much less the
power to designate income beneficiaries.
The Court concluded that a majority shareholder in seeking to
exercise control over dividend policy for the purposes of designating
income beneficiaries would be subject to substantial legal and economic
restraints 51 The legal restraints emphasized by the majority were the
fiduciary duties of the corporate directors which could be enforced
either through a suit by the trustee on behalf of the trust or by the
minority shareholders of all three corporations who were unrelated
to Byrum. It is submitted, however, that an analysis of these restraints
indicates that they may not be nearly so limiting as the majority sug-
gested. In particular, the threat of a derivative suit by minority
shareholders to compel the declaration of dividends may not be a
realistic threat." As one commentator has noted:
The cases in which courts have refused to require declaration
of dividends or larger dividends despite the existence of
current earnings or a substantial surplus or both are nu-
C. Chalmers, 31 T.C.M. 792 (1972). In that case the settlor retained the right to change
the securities in which the trust invested. The Government's assertion that such a right
enabled the settlor to shift trust income and thus designate income beneficiary was re-
jected by the Tax Court, which cited Byrum as controlling. Id. at 794.
42 408 U.S. at 137.
50 Id. at 143. The Court clearly indicated an assumption that had the answer been
positive, it would have had to consider the second question. Id. at 144. The Court's actual
language was: "We do not hold that a settlor 'may keep the power of income allocation'
. . . we hold . . . that this settlor did not retain the power to allocate income within
the meaning of the statute." Id. at 145 n.27.
51 Id. at 139-42.
52
 See Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Spec. T. 1947); contra, Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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merous; plaintiffs have won only a small minority of these
cases. . . . The courts have accepted the general defense of
discretion, supplemented by one or more of a number of
grounds put forward as reasons for not paying dividends,
or larger dividends ... . 53
Thus the existence of a fiduciary duty to the corporation on the
part of a director or a majority shareholder does not place strong
limitations on the dividend decision. Similarly, the importance that the
Court attached to the existence of unrelated minority shareholders with
legal standing to enforce the directors' fiduciary duty" seems over-
stated in view of the fact that suits to compel dividends are rarely
successful.
Nor does another factor on which the Byrum Court relied realisti-
cally provide the claimed restraint. Although the trustee is under a legal
duty, as fiduciary," to prosecute claims on behalf of the trust, it does
not appear realistic to expect him to bring suit against an individual
who has the power to remove him as trustee. It may not be unreason-
able to speculate that the trustee in Byrum may also have had consid-
erable business dealings with the corporations apart from his role as
trustee," and that a suit might seriously prejudice his position vis-a-vis
the corporations. According to this speculation it would seem that the
trustee's perception of his fiduciary duties might well be colored by
his business relationship with Byrum's three corporations.
Similarly, general business vicissitudes which the majority re-
garded as providing economic restraints on the declaration of dividends
would be important only in a case where the controlling shareholder
was attempting to flood the trust with income." It is true that if the
goal of a settlor were to flood the trust with income through declaration
of large dividends, business reversal arising from factors beyond his
control could decrease income and would certainly limit his ability to
flood the trust. However, this point seems relatively unimportant to
the central issue, since in reality such a situation does not appear likely
to provide a ground for application of section 20.36(a) (2): that is,
even if Byrum could have flooded the trust with income, he could not
legally have compelled the trustee to distribute it since Byrum had
unequivocably relinquished that right in the trust agreement." In con-
53 W. Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1587 (4th ed. 1989).
54 408 U.S. at 142. There were minority shareholders unrelated to Byrum in all
three corporations. Id. at n.20.
55 The Trust Agreement explicitly granted the trustee power "Rbo enforce . . . any
claim or demand whatsoever arising out of or which may exist against the Trust Estate."
Id. at n.22.
50 For a discussion of the interrelationship of various departments within banks, see
generally Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall,"
14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 21 (1972).
sT This follows because Byrum's power to deny income through denial of dividends
would be meaningless in a situation in which the corporations had no money to distribute.
58 See Article IV of the Trust Agreement, 408 U.S. at 127 n.l.
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trast, the Government's argument and the dissenting opinion in Byrum
correctly emphasized that the power to designate income with which
they were concerned was the power to withhold income. That is, the
Government predicated the application of section 2036(a) (2) entirely
on Byrum's alleged retained power to deprive the present beneficiary
of income by pursuing a low-or-no dividend policy. It may be surmised
that the Government necessarily recognized that Byrum could never
designate in the other direction—that is, in favor of the present bene-
ficiary—since he had relinquished the right to distribute income.
Therefore the portion of the majority opinion focusing on the eco-
nomic restraints which would limit large dividend declarations appears
irrelevant to the issue of income designation in Byrum.
In fact, the only sanction which may compel the declaration of
dividends is the possibility of the imposition of the excess profits tax."
However, the excess profits tax does not compel declaration of divi-
dends, but, in effect, taxes the failure to do so. Thus the inducement
to declare dividends is uncertain and indirect at best, especially in light
of the fact that this tax does not apply if the corporation has legitimate
business needs which require the retention of earnings ° 0 Thus it is
submitted that the limiting effect of these legal and economic restraints
are more imagined than real.
Up to this point it has been suggested that the "right-power" dis-
tinction adopted by the Byrum court was the correct one since it prop-
erly limits the scope of section 2036(a) (2). Now it is further sug-
gested that the majority relied on a fallacious premise when it sought
to rest its decision on the existence of restraints on the settlor's power
to maintain a low dividend policy, since such restraints may well be
illusory. The Byrum court should have admitted the unlikelihood of
these restraints functioning effectively and focused on the critical issue
of this case: whether retention of an unlimited power to restrict divi-
dends payable to the trust is equivalent to the right to designate income
beneficiaries. However, by sidestepping that issue°' and by expressly
limiting the result to the situation in Byrum,82 the majority has left the
state of the law under section 2036(a) (2) somewhat confused. The
possibility now exists that in a future case, supported by a record com-
plete with detailed financial data, the result may be different." An
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37.
6° Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 533, 534, 537 provide that the corporation can furnish
evidence that the accumulation of surplus was necessary to meet a reasonable business
need.
61 The majority may have relied on the rationale involving legal restraints on corpora-
tions in order to avoid criticism that the decision was one of form over substance, but
the dissent raised exactly this criticism. 408 U.S. at 153. It is submitted that a decision
relying on a literal, albeit narrow, interpretation of § 2036(a) (2) would be a more tenable
one and would not represent a form over substance rationale.
62 408 U.S. at 144 n.25.
63
 See id. at n.26, in which the majority discussed the lack of information in the
record in the following manner:
[T]he fallacy in the dissenting opinion's position here is that the record simply
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opposite result might also occur if there are no minority shareholders
or the corporation involved is wholly family-owned.
Although the Court overemphasized the importance of economic
restraints on Byrum vis-à-vis the corporations, it is submitted that the
result reached is a correct one. The intent of section 2036(a) (2) was
to tax only those transfers in which the grantor retained a legally en-
forceable right to designate income beneficiaries. Neither specific statu-
tory language nor the legislative context in which it was formulated
provides authority in section 2036(a) (2) to tax a trust in which a
settlor, seeking to retain control of a closely held corporation, also
indirectly retained some power to effect the amount of income which a
particular beneficiary might receive through his control over declara-
tions of corporate dividends. Admittedly this restrictive interpretation
of the statute would allow a settlor to retain control of a closely held
corporation while transferring most of his stock to an inter vivos trust
and thus avoid a substantial estate tax burden. Assuming this is so, the
resolution of the problem, as the majority opinion indicated," lies with
Congress. In enacting any new legislation, Congress should consider
the substantial liquidity problem which faces an estate whose wealth
consists largely of individual shares of stock with little or no market
value, as is usually the case in a closely held, family-owned corpora-
tion.°5 A trust similar to the one in Byrum provides a useful estate
planning tool for easing a potentially crushing liquidity problem in such
an estate.'" A congressional limitation on the extent to which this tool
could be utilized would serve to relieve the burdens of such an estate
while simultaneously insuring that inheritances that Congressional
policy intends to be taxed will not pass to a settlor's heirs tax free.
JOHN F. HURLEY, JR.
does not support it. This case was decided on a motion for summary judgment.
The record does not disclose anything with respect to the earnings or financial
conditions of these corporations. We simply do not know whether there were
any earnings for the years in question, whether there was an earned surplus in
any of the corporations, or whether—if some earnings be assumed—they were
adequate in light of other corporate needs to justify dividend payments.
64
 Id. at 135.
65
 Id. at 10 n.34.
66 The Court appeared to have this factor in mind when it referred to the plight
of the small closely held corporation at the time of the death of the principal shareholder.
Id. The Court pointed out:
The typical closely held corporation is small, has a checkered earning record, and
has no market for its shares. Yet its shares often have substantial asset value.
To prevent the crippling liquidity problem that would result from the imposition
of estate taxes on such shares, the controlling shareholder's estate planning often
includes an irrevocable trust. The Government and the dissenting opinion would
deny to controlling shareholders the privilege of using this generally acceptable
method of estate planning without adverse tax consequences. Yet a settlor whose
wealth consisted of listed securities of corporations he did not control would be
permitted the tax advantage of the Irrevocable trust even though his more mar-
ketable assets present a far less serious liquidity problem.
Id.
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